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ABSTRACT: Since enacting comprehensive health care reform in 2003, Maine’s Dirigo Health 
program has helped expand coverage for low- and moderate-income individuals. By September 
2006, about 16,100 individuals were enrolled in two coverage initiatives: DirigoChoice, a 
subsidized insurance product, and a Medicaid eligibility expansion for low-income parents of 
dependent children. While these programs are making health coverage more affordable to low-
income individuals, small firms, and sole proprietors, with subsidies targeting those most in need, 
by late 2006, the initiatives had enrolled less than 10 percent of previously uninsured residents. To 
pay for this expanded coverage, Maine has utilized savings in the overall health care system due to 
lower uncompensated care and cost controls. However, the funds raised thus far are insufficient to 
pay for greater subsidized enrollment in Dirigo programs, leading to a search for other financing 
sources to sustain the program. 
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 LEADING THE WAY? 
MAINE’S INITIAL EXPERIENCE IN EXPANDING COVERAGE 
THROUGH DIRIGO HEALTH REFORMS 
 
 
OVERVIEW 
In 2003, Maine adopted the Dirigo Health Reform Act, which aimed to make affordable 
health care coverage available to every Maine citizen by 2009, slow the growth of health 
care costs, and improve the quality of care. “Dirigo,” the state’s motto, meaning “I lead” 
in Latin, is a fitting name for the program. At the time the legislation passed, Maine was 
the first state since the early 1990s to enact comprehensive health care reform legislation 
and to set a goal of providing affordable health insurance coverage to everyone in the state. 
 
Since then, several other states, notably Massachusetts and Vermont, enacted 
ambitious health reform and universal health coverage legislation, and Illinois adopted 
legislation to cover all children. In 2007, more than a dozen states considered proposals 
that strive for universal health coverage. Lessons from Maine’s experience implementing 
the Dirigo Health program could be useful to these and other states in their efforts to 
expand insurance coverage. 
 
Is Maine leading the way toward universal coverage? This study examined interim 
indicators of Maine’s progress in providing affordable health insurance coverage after two 
years of program implementation, midway between the legislation’s adoption and its 2009 
goal. (The study’s research methods and data sources are described at the end of this report.) 
 
The evaluation focused on the state’s progress in implementing Dirigo Health’s 
two major coverage initiatives: 1) DirigoChoice, a subsidized health insurance program, 
initiated in January 2005, for eligible small businesses, self-employed workers, and 
individuals; and 2) an increase in the annual income eligibility level (from 150% to 200% 
of the federal poverty level, or FPL) in the state’s Medicaid program (called MaineCare) 
for parents of dependent children under age 19. 
 
These two initiatives built on a series of previous Medicaid eligibility expansions, 
including a program started in 2002 to cover childless adults earning up to 100 percent 
FPL. The Dirigo Health Reform Act authorized expanded eligibility for this group to 
125 percent FPL, but it was not implemented due to budget constraints related to the 
terms of a federal Medicaid waiver. However, this study examined enrollment trends 
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 among childless adults since that program operated concurrently with Dirigo expansions 
and offered another avenue for coverage gains among low-income individuals. 
 
Key Findings 
• Enrollment in Dirigo Coverage Programs. In September 2006, after 20 
months of operation, almost 11,100 individuals were enrolled in DirigoChoice, 
about one-third of whom did not have coverage before enrolling. Another 5,000 
parents with income between 150 percent and 200 percent FPL had enrolled in 
the Medicaid parent expansion. The number of previously uninsured individuals 
enrolled in the two Dirigo programs—an estimated 9,000 to 11,000—is modest 
relative to the estimated 136,000 residents uninsured in 2002. 
• Small Firm Response to DirigoChoice. As of September 2006, about 700 
small firms had enrolled in DirigoChoice. The average firm size is seven 
employees. Half of the firms had not previously offered health benefits to 
employees. Despite this progress, enrolled firms compose about 2.5 percent of all 
businesses in the state eligible to enroll. Survey results indicate that very small 
firms, those with two or three employees, find the product unaffordable. 
• Subsidies Targeted to the Working Poor. Nearly 80 percent of DirigoChoice 
members have family income below 300 percent FPL, qualifying them for 
premium and deductible subsidies. Almost half (46%) of all DirigoChoice 
members earn less than 150 percent FPL and therefore qualify for the greatest 
discounts. In September 2006, twice as many individuals were covered by the two 
Medicaid eligibility expansions for parents and childless adults (about 23,100) than 
were enrolled in DirigoChoice (11,100), suggesting that low-income individuals 
found a fully subsidized public plan preferable to a partially subsidized private plan. 
• Financing Source for Coverage Expansion is Difficult to Sustain. Maine 
planned to finance most of the cost of DirigoChoice subsidies through an 
innovative approach, called the “savings offset payment” (SOP). It sought to 
capture savings to health care providers from lower uncompensated care costs and 
other cost-saving initiatives through assessments on health insurance claims. 
However, the aggregate measurable cost savings attributable to Dirigo initiatives 
has produced lower revenues for subsidies than needed to finance much greater 
program enrollment. In addition, the process of measuring Dirigo’s impact on costs 
has become so adversarial that nearly all stakeholders regard finding alternative 
funding sources for DirigoChoice subsidies necessary for sustaining the program. 
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 MAINE’S HEALTH SYSTEM PRIOR TO DIRIGO HEALTH 
When the Dirigo Health reform legislation was enacted in 2003, 13 percent of Maine’s 
population under age 65 was uninsured (about 136,000 residents), compared with the 
national average of 17 percent.1
 
State policymakers focused their coverage expansion efforts on uninsured, low-
income working families. A 2002 household survey showed that workers and families 
affiliated with small businesses or those that were self-employed made up more than half 
of the state’s uninsured residents.2 Since eligibility for the state Medicaid program had 
already been expanded, Maine tried to boost its relatively low rate of employer-sponsored 
coverage—50 percent of Maine’s private employers offered health benefits to workers in 
2004, compared with the U.S. average of 56 percent. This is attributable partly to the 
prevalence of small firms (i.e., 50 or fewer workers), which are less likely to offer health 
benefits than larger firms due to higher health insurance premium costs. 
 
Indeed, in 2002, Maine had the second highest employer premium costs in the 
country, adjusted for the quality of benefits.3 In 2004, Maine also had the second-highest 
personal health care spending per capita in the country, behind Massachusetts and tied 
with New York.4 Before the adoption of Dirigo Health, employers were acutely 
concerned about premium growth. Average per member per year small group premiums 
increased 33 percent in 2001 and 29 percent in 2002.5 While average rate increases have 
moderated since then, they have remained well above the rate of general inflation, even as 
the benefits covered by small group plans have declined. 
 
The state’s high cost of health care and health insurance premiums shaped the 
focus and design of the Dirigo Health coverage expansion initiatives. Reforms enacted by 
the state in the 1990s ensured that small groups and individuals seeking insurance could 
not be refused coverage, but many could not afford it. Thus, Dirigo Health reform was 
designed to link coverage expansion with cost containment efforts to make affordable 
products available to small businesses and to individuals. While this is a challenging goal 
anywhere in the country, the state’s high premium costs from the outset made reaching it 
much more difficult. 
 
ELIGIBILITY FOR DIRIGOCHOICE SUBSIDIES AND 
MEDICAID EXPANSION GROUPS 
Dirigo Health’s two major coverage expansion strategies, which both target low- and 
moderate-income people, were designed to work in tandem (Figure 1). DirigoChoice was 
created to make a small group and individual insurance product more affordable by 
partially subsidizing premiums and deductibles of eligible enrollees. At the same time, 
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 eligibility for MaineCare was expanded to make fully subsidized health coverage available 
to the poorest residents: childless adults earning less than the poverty level and low-
income parents of children under age 19 with family income of up to 200 percent FPL 
(increased from the previous limit of 150% FPL). Eligibility for both MaineCare programs 
is subject to a $2,000 asset limit. 
 
 
Figure 1. Eligibility for DirigoChoice Subsidies
and MaineCare Expansions
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Source: Dirigo Health Agency, 2007.  
 
 
DirigoChoice members enrolled through an employer can be simultaneously 
enrolled in MaineCare if they qualify.6 In such cases, MaineCare would cover the 
enrollee’s DirigoChoice payments, including deductibles and other cost-sharing, and pay 
for any MaineCare benefits not covered by DirigoChoice. This arrangement also allows 
those enrolled in both programs to maintain their health coverage, if a wage increase 
makes them ineligible for Medicaid. In that case, they can switch to DirigoChoice 
coverage only, but still qualify for premium and other cost-sharing subsidies. 
 
DIRIGOCHOICE SUBSIDY STRUCTURE 
Maine residents at any income level may enroll in DirigoChoice, but only those with 
family income below 300 percent FPL qualify for discounted premiums and deductibles, 
and out-of-pocket maximums.7 The discounts and out-of-pocket limits are based on a 
sliding scale relative to income (see Table 1). For workers and dependents enrolled 
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 through a small employer, the discount on the monthly premium is applied only to the 
employee share of the premium. Enrollees with family income at or above 300 percent 
FPL must pay the entire monthly premium (or employee share if group-enrolled) and the 
entire deductible. 
 
 
Table 1. Enrollee Share of DirigoChoice Premiums and Deductibles 
Covered by Subsidy for Each Discount Group 
Discount Group—Income Levels by Federal Poverty Level (FPL)* 
Member Type 
A 
MaineCare 
Eligible** 
B 
100%–149% 
FPL** 
C 
150%–199% 
FPL** 
D 
200%–249% 
FPL 
E 
250%–299% 
FPL 
F 
(no subsidy)
>300% FPL
Individual 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 
Small firm worker*** 100 80 60 40 20 0 
Sole proprietor 40 32 24 16 8 0 
* The program uses FPL guidelines for the previous year. For example, 2005 federal guidelines apply to the program for 
those enrolling during 2006. 
** Some people with incomes below 100% FPL may fall into Group B if their assets are above the state’s Medicaid limits 
of $2,000 for individuals and $3,000 for couples (excluding one car and a house). Conversely, some parents with incomes 
between 100% and 199% FPL may fall into Group A because they are MaineCare eligible. 
*** The subsidy percentage is the discount on the employee’s share of coverage costs, not the full amount. When the 
employer pays the minimum 60% premium, the effective subsidy against the full premium (both employer and employee 
shares) would be 40% for Group A and 8% for Group E. The same applies to sole proprietors. 
 
 
For example, a parent with one or more children whose annual earnings total 
$15,000 would qualify for the 80 percent discount (Group B); if the adult’s employer did 
not offer coverage, he or she could enroll in DirigoChoice as an individual. The plan 
normally has a $3,500 annual deductible, but the Group B subsidy would reduce the 
member share to $700. Similarly, the monthly premium—about $600 for one adult and 
any number of children in late 2006—would be $120 per month after the subsidy. 
 
DIRIGOCHOICE BENEFITS AND ADMINISTRATION 
As in other states, DirigoChoice has struggled with trade-offs between coverage and cost 
in the design of its benefit package. The Dirigo Health Reform Act required the program 
to develop a comprehensive benefit package, but higher deductibles than initially desired 
were required to keep premiums competitive with other products on the market.8 In 
addition, the program initially planned to require employers to contribute at least 60 
percent of the premium for both single and dependent coverage. Small firm opposition 
forced the program to make it optional for employers to contribute to the cost of 
dependent coverage. 
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 During 2005–06, the DirigoChoice program had two plan options, which differed 
by deductible level. Plan 1, available only to small groups, had an annual deductible of 
$1,250 for singles and $2,500 for families. Plan 2, the only option for individual enrollees, 
but also available to small groups, had an annual deductible of $1,750 for singles and 
$3,500 for families. By comparison, in 2006, nearly three-quarters of individual policies in 
Maine had deductibles of $5,000 or more.9 Recent concern about employer premium 
costs led to the addition of a new option for small groups in 2007 that has a $2,500 
deductible for singles. After the deductible has been met, most services require 
coinsurance payments of 20 percent for care provided by network providers and 50 
percent from non-network providers. 
 
Preventive benefits such as annual physicals, immunizations, and screening exams 
are covered in full, with no deductible, coinsurance, or copayment. The program 
promotes affiliation with a primary care physician by paying new DirigoChoice enrollees 
$25 when they select a primary care physician and $75 per family upon completion of a 
health risk assessment. Mental health services are covered to the same extent as physical 
health benefits, similar to plans offered by large employers in Maine but unlike typical 
plans of very small firms (10 or fewer employees) and individual policies, according to key 
informants. Copays for prescription drugs vary, depending on whether the drug is generic 
($10), preferred brand name ($20), or non-preferred brand name ($40). 
 
Unlike other individual insurance products in Maine, DirigoChoice does not 
impose preexisting condition exclusions. According to some key informants, this provision 
made the program a magnet for individuals with health conditions that made it hard for 
them to afford coverage outside of DirigoChoice. A few thousand people covered by 
Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield’s (Anthem) individual policy reportedly switched to 
DirigoChoice. However, initial claims experience for individuals in DirigoChoice does 
not indicate excessive adverse selection, as discussed below. 
 
DirigoChoice was designed to be jointly operated by the public and private sectors. 
A publicly administered, privately insured plan would make the program more like other 
employer products, rather than a program run solely by a government agency. A privately 
insured plan was also favored by providers, who regarded further expansion of MaineCare 
as undesirable because of its low payment rates relative to private insurance rates. 
 
The Dirigo Health Agency (DHA), an independent executive agency governed by 
a publicly appointed board of directors, manages the program. DHA has the authority to 
assess the SOP and administer subsidies to qualified enrollees. DHA issues DirigoChoice 
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 contracts with employers on behalf of member employees and dependents, and with 
individual members. 
 
DHA and the Department of Health and Human Services, which administers the 
MaineCare program, contracted with a private plan to insure the product and administer 
claims. While the state sought bids from several carriers, only Anthem submitted one for 
the initial contract period. Thus, during the first three years, Anthem has been the insurer 
for DirigoChoice members. Since Maine law permits only state-licensed insurers and 
agents to sell insurance, small groups and individuals who purchase DirigoChoice must do 
so through Anthem’s direct sales force and its agents, or via independent brokers. 
Applicants for DirigoChoice subsidies must submit a separate application to DHA. 
 
Anthem’s contract with DHA contained risk-sharing provisions to indemnify the 
company against the unknown risks associated with a group with medical expenses that 
could not be easily predicted. Called the “experience modification program” (EMP), the 
state agreed to pay $8 million in the first year if the medical loss ratio exceeded 80 percent. 
 
ENROLLMENT IN DIRIGOCHOICE 
As of September 2006, DirigoChoice had about 11,100 enrollees; enrollment 
was especially strong among individual enrollees and sole proprietors. 
By September 2006, 20 months after the program began, the DirigoChoice program had 
about 11,086 current members, and 14,715 ever-enrolled members (i.e., including those 
who disenrolled).10 About 42 percent were enrolled as individuals, 30 percent as small 
group members, and 28 percent as sole proprietors (Figure 2). 
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 Figure 2. Cumulative Net Enrollment in DirigoChoice,
January 2005–September 2006
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Anticipating that interest in the product would be high among sole proprietors and 
individuals, but concerned they might be a higher risk group, DHA set a limit of 4,400 
enrollees from these groups for the first year. This also served to limit the cost of subsidies, 
which the state funded from general revenue during the first year. When enrollment 
exceeded this level after just three months, the program froze new enrollment to individuals 
and sole proprietors. In January 2006, the program lifted the freeze and by September 2006, 
individuals and sole proprietors represented double the maximum allowed in the first year. 
 
Within Maine, much has been made of the fact that total DirigoChoice enrollment 
was less than the initial projection of 41,000 during the first year, 31,000 of whom were 
expected to qualify for subsidies. Enrollment by small groups in particular was well below 
initial projections. However, the enrollment estimates served as an upper limit on the 
state’s potential financial obligation during the first year when subsidies would be funded 
by state general revenues. Therefore, comparing projected to actual enrollment is not a 
useful yardstick for measuring progress. Maine’s experience, however, provides a sobering 
lesson to other states in setting public expectations regarding early enrollment. 
 
Enrollment in MaineCare expansion groups exceeded DirigoChoice enrollment. 
In September 2006, just over 5,000 parents were enrolled in the Dirigo-authorized 
Medicaid expansion parent group. Another 18,100 individuals were covered through the 
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 Medicaid eligibility expansion for childless adults with family income below 100 percent 
FPL, which was open to enrollment periodically during the same time that the Dirigo-
authorized coverage expansions went into effect. Hence, in September 2006, of the 
34,200 individuals covered under MaineCare eligibility expansion or through 
DirigoChoice, MaineCare covered two-thirds (23,100). This suggests that low-income 
individuals found a fully subsidized public plan preferable to a partially subsidized private 
plan, and that a large number of low-income uninsured people do not have access to 
DirigoChoice through their employers. Despite the popularity of Medicaid, further 
expansion of coverage via Medicaid remains politically difficult in Maine, as program 
expenses consume almost one of every four dollars of the state general fund. 
 
About one-third of DirigoChoice enrollees were previously uninsured. 
Between 31 percent and 36 percent of DirigoChoice enrollees did not have health 
coverage prior to enrollment.11 Thus, in September 2006, midway between the program’s 
adoption and its 2009 goals, DirigoChoice covered an estimated 4,400 to 6,000 previously 
uninsured residents. Data about previous insurance status of parents and childless adults 
covered through Medicaid eligibility expansions are not available, but it is generally 
assumed that most did not have insurance at the time they enrolled. 
 
Individual members composed the majority of 2006 DirigoChoice enrollees who 
were previously uninsured for the entire 12 months prior to enrollment. However, within 
DirigoChoice member categories, small group members were most likely to have been 
uninsured for the entire 12 months before enrollment (37% of such members), compared 
with 30 percent of sole proprietors and 28 percent of individuals (Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2. Previous Health Coverage Among DirigoChoice Members 
Who Enrolled in 2006 
 Had any coverage 
in past 12 months 
No coverage 
for all 12 months 
No usable 
response 
Small group 54% 37% 9% 
Sole proprietor 67 30 3 
Individual 68 28 4 
All members 65 31 4 
Source: MPR tabulation of DirigoChoice member enrollment as of September 2006. 
 
 
The Dirigo Health Reform Act aimed to make coverage more affordable, not 
simply increase coverage rates. This explains why so many DirigoChoice members had 
insurance before enrolling. DHA reported 29 percent of previously insured members were 
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 underinsured, which they defined as those with annual income less than twice the FPL 
and deductibles greater than 5 percent of income. It also explains why the state does not 
require individuals to go without coverage for a minimum period of time before joining, 
and allows small firms that previously offered coverage to enroll. The program does try 
to dissuade employers from dropping worker health benefits by requiring individuals 
whose employer discontinued a previous offer of coverage to wait 12 months before 
becoming eligible. 
 
DirigoChoice subsidies have helped make health insurance more affordable to 
low-income individuals and families. 
Overall, nearly 80 percent of DirigoChoice members receive premium and deductible 
subsidies. Almost half (46%) of all members, and two-thirds (66%) of individual members, 
receive the greatest subsidies (Group B) because their family income is below 150 percent 
FPL (Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3. Enrollment in DirigoChoice, 
Projected Year 1 (2005) vs. Actual as of September 2006 
 
 
Member Distribution 
Projected Year 1 
Enrollment (2005)* 
Percent (number) 
Current Enrollment 
(as of 9/06)** 
Percent (number) 
Number Ever Enrolled
(as of 9/06)** 
Percent (number) 
Small group 90% (37,000) 30% (3,350) 35% (5,162) 
Sole proprietor 28% (3,051) 26% (3,896) 
Individual 
10% (4,000)*** 
42% (4,685) 38% (5,657) 
Total 100% (41,000 members) 100% (11,086 members) 100% (14,715 members) 
Subsidy Discount Level Percent of members Percent of members Percent of members 
A (MaineCare Eligible)**** 11% 1% 1% 
B (below 150% FPL) 3 49 46 
C (150%–199% FPL) 6 16 16 
D (200%–249% FPL) 29 10 11 
E (250%–299% FPL) 26 4 5 
F (no subsidy, >300% FPL) 24 20 22 
Total 100 (41,000 members) 100% (11,086 members) 100% (14,715 members) 
* Source: Maine Dirigo Health Agency, Request for Proposal, May 8, 2004. 
** Source: MPR tabulation of Maine Dirigo Health Agency administrative data as of Sept. 2006. 
*** In Year 1, the program set an enrollment cap of 4,000 self-employed and individuals, all expected to be subsidized, but 
this was later raised to 4,400. 
**** DirigoChoice rules specify that individual applicants (i.e., not small firm employees) who are MaineCare eligible cannot 
be dually enrolled in both programs, but administrative data shows some individuals as dual enrollees. This could be due to 
data inaccuracies or special circumstances (e.g., a parent is an individual in DirigoChoice and child is in MaineCare). 
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 The study’s survey of small businesses in the state indicates that among firms 
enrolled in DirigoChoice that previously offered health coverage, most reported they are 
covering about the same (69%) or more (20%) employees than under their prior plan.12 
The most common reason given for an increase in employee take-up of health benefits 
was the affordability of DirigoChoice to workers; in these cases, subsidies made employee 
premium contributions to DirigoChoice more affordable. 
 
MEMBER MIX AFFECTS COST AND FINANCING 
Differences between projected and actual enrollment in DirigoChoice—in 
terms of member type and income level—have increased state program costs 
for low-income enrollee subsidies beyond original estimates. 
While lower-than-expected enrollment in DirigoChoice is not a problem per se, less-
than-expected enrollment among certain segments of the eligible population has had 
negative repercussions. 
 
For example, in September 2006, small group-enrolled workers represented 
approximately 30 percent of total DirigoChoice enrollment, compared with initial 
projections that such members would compose a majority of total enrollment (Table 3). 
The low proportion of small group members in DirigoChoice relative to total enrollment 
increased the state’s financial burden for subsidizing individuals’ premiums and deductibles, 
because the state pays the entire cost rather than just the employee share. 
 
In addition, lower-than-anticipated enrollment in DirigoChoice among the 
previously uninsured has meant less reduction in providers’ bad debt and charity care than 
was expected, which limits the revenues that can be raised from the SOP. These funding 
constraints have forced the state to institute recurring freezes on enrollment, which has 
resulted in periodic waiting lists. 
 
DIRIGO’S IMPACT ON MAINE’S UNINSURED 
The total number of previously uninsured individuals covered by Dirigo Health 
programs—DirigoChoice and the Medicaid eligibility expansion for parents—is 
modest relative to the estimated 136,000 uninsured individuals in the state in 2002. 
The number of previously uninsured people who gained coverage under Dirigo’s 
initiatives (DirigoChoice and the parent expansion group) to date is less than 10 percent of 
those lacking insurance before the start of the programs. While this is a good start, Dirigo 
Health coverage expansion initiatives have not yet made a large dent in the state’s 
uninsured rate. 
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 When the number of people covered through the Medicaid expansion program 
for childless adults is also taken into account, the share of uninsured residents gaining 
coverage through state coverage expansion initiatives since 2002 rises—possibly as high as 
25 percent. But the number of people enrolled in the MaineCare childless adult program 
has been highly volatile during 2005 and 2006, with enrollment freezes frequently being 
instituted and then lifted. 
 
Dirigo Health’s eventual impact on the state’s rate of uninsured cannot yet be 
determined. DirigoChoice is still undergoing changes; its early experiences are not 
indicative of future success. In addition, Dirigo Health coverage initiatives were intended 
to work in concert with broader health reforms addressing cost, quality, and health 
promotion. The state had just begun to implement these other reforms when this 
evaluation was conducted. Finally, data limitations constrain our ability to measure the 
impact on the state’s uninsured rate. There has not been a state household survey of 
insurance status since 2002, and annual Current Population Survey data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau on the insurance status of state residents are too imprecise and delayed to 
measure declines in the uninsured that may be attributable to Dirigo coverage initiatives. 
 
SMALL FIRM RESPONSE TO DIRIGOCHOICE 
Participation in and opinions of DirigoChoice differ, indicating it is well-
designed for some but not all segments of the small firm market. 
The DirigoChoice program was designed to shore up employer-based health insurance 
among small employers. Thus, their response is an important indicator of the success of 
the state’s coverage expansion strategy. It is also a critical determinant of program costs. 
 
A survey of small firms in Maine conducted for this evaluation found that very 
small firms (two to 10 workers) are disproportionately enrolled in the program; the average 
size is seven employees.13 By contrast, firms offering health plans other than DirigoChoice 
have an average of 18 employees, and firms not offering any health plan have, on average, 
five employees (Table 4). DirigoChoice has also attracted many “micro” firms (i.e., those 
with three or fewer workers), but its appeal diminishes as the average percent of 
employees earning less than $12 per hour increases. This suggests very small firms with 
more workers earning such low wages are less able to afford employee health benefits. 
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 Table 4. Employer Characteristics by Dirigo Participation Decision 
 
All firms 
responding 
(100%) 
Firms that offer
DirigoChoice 
(66%) 
Firms offering 
another health plan
(16%) 
Firms that do not 
offer coverage 
(18%) 
Average number 
of employees 
8 7 18* 5* 
Average 
percentage of 
employees earning 
<$12/hour 
44% 45% 26% 55% 
Average monthly 
employer cost of 
single coverage 
N/A $336** $365** N/A 
Main reason 
did not enroll in 
DirigoChoice 
N/A N/A 
Too costly for firm
(48% of respondents)
Too costly for firm
(68% of respondents)
* p<.01 statistically significant difference relative to the mean for firms offering DirigoChoice. 
** p<.05 statistically significant difference between the two groups based on linear regression model 
predicting per member per month contribution for single employees adjusted for firm size. 
Source: MPR Survey of Small Firms in Maine, 2006. 
 
 
About half of DirigoChoice enrolled firms did not offer health benefits 
previously; affordability drove most decisions to join. 
Just over half of DirigoChoice enrolled firms (51%) did not previously offer coverage—a 
promising indication of the product’s appeal to these firms. Such firms were more likely to 
have three or fewer employees, compared with firms that did offer health benefits prior to 
enrolling in DirigoChoice. Their primary reason for enrolling in the program was 
affordability (55%), followed by a belief that it offered the best coverage for their business 
(19%), or they had no other plan options (9%). 
 
DirigoChoice firms pay lower monthly premiums for single employees than 
firms offering other plans. 
Among firms enrolled in DirigoChoice, the average monthly premium for single 
employees ($336) was lower than the premiums paid by firms offering other health plans 
($365). While the difference is statistically significant, the $30/per month in savings 
appears to be too small to persuade small firms already offering coverage to switch to 
DirigoChoice. The higher price paid by firms offering non-Dirigo plans could reflect 
many factors, including more generous benefits, lower deductibles, and differences in 
group size, average age, and type of business, all of which can be used by insurers to adjust 
small group premium rates. 
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 Most firms that previously offered insurance found DirigoChoice cost and 
benefits to be equal to, or better than, prior plans. 
Among DirigoChoice firms that switched from another insurance plan, most reported per-
employee health insurance premiums that were the same or lower than what they paid 
before (Figure 3). Four of five DirigoChoice firms that previously offered coverage found 
benefits to be as good as, or better than, those under their prior plan. 
 
 
Figure 3. Average Change in Employer Contribution
Under DirigoChoice Compared with Prior Coverage
16%
33%
32%
20%
52%
47%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Premium
contribution
Annual
deductible Lower
Same
Higher
Source: Mathematica Policy Research 2006 Survey of Small Employers in Maine.
Average reported differences between DirigoChoice and previous plan
 
 
 
Small firm enrollment remains modest relative to the number of eligible firms, 
mostly due to unaffordable premium costs. 
The 700 firms enrolled in DirigoChoice in September 2006 compose an estimated 2.5 
percent of all eligible small businesses in the state. The limited participation is not due to a 
lack of awareness about the program. Among firms not currently offering any health benefits 
to their workers, 64 percent were somewhat or very familiar with DirigoChoice; only 9 
percent had never heard of it. Over half (53%) of non-offering firms thought the program 
would be good for the firm and two-thirds thought it would be good for their employees. 
By a large margin (83%), non-offering firms say they do not offer any coverage—either 
DirigoChoice or another plan—because premiums are too high. While the program is 
changing to respond to the needs of small firms, the survey results indicate that for many 
firms, especially the smallest, DirigoChoice coverage remains too expensive. Dirigo’s 
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 broader cost-savings efforts continue, but it remains to be seen whether they can drive 
down costs to make premiums more affordable to such firms. 
 
THE CHALLENGE OF FINANCING DIRIGOCHOICE SUBSIDIES 
Revenues from the savings offset payment have been insufficient to cover 
substantially more individuals needing subsidies, thereby limiting higher 
enrollment in DirigoChoice. 
The program anticipated that the SOP would finance most of the cost of subsidizing 
DirigoChoice premiums and deductibles for low-income enrollees, and for the MaineCare 
parent eligibility expansion (Figure 4). So far, the aggregate measurable cost savings, which 
determines the SOP assessment, has been less than the amount needed to allow much 
higher enrollment among those qualifying for subsidies in DirigoChoice, requiring the 
state to rely more on general revenues. (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Dirigo Health Financing Sources, 2006
Sources: 2007 Dirigo Health Agency allocation request to the Maine legislature;
Dirigo Health Agency, 2006, Annual Report: Program Overview 2005 & 2006.
DirigoChoice
Member Contribution
40%
State General Funds
(carryover from 2005)
29%
Savings
Offset Payment
31%
 
 
 
The premise of the SOP, as in some other state expansion proposals, is that 
expanded coverage will reduce health care provider costs associated with delivering care to 
those without insurance. Maine sought to capture the savings associated with increases in 
coverage, as well as savings due to other cost-control efforts, through an assessment on 
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 insurers. Health plans were expected to recoup the cost by reducing payments to providers 
commensurate with the reduction in the provision of uncompensated care and other costs. 
 
The strategy depended on enrolling a substantial number of uninsured people into 
DirigoChoice or the Medicaid eligibility expansions authorized by the Dirigo law and on 
producing evidence of savings from these and other initiatives. When DirigoChoice did 
not enroll as many uninsured as expected, and greater savings from other Dirigo initiatives 
could not be documented, there was a corresponding drop in revenue that could be raised 
through the SOP. 
 
Other anticipated revenue sources also fell short. As mentioned, less-than-expected 
enrollment both by small firms and higher-income enrollees reduced employer and 
member contributions. Federal Medicaid matching funds for MaineCare-eligible enrollees 
were also lower than expected because very few DirigoChoice group members were 
eligible for MaineCare. 
 
Savings offset payment proved controversial, difficult to sustain. 
Though conceptually sound, the process for estimating aggregate measurable cost savings, 
which determine the SOP amount, was vulnerable to criticism about the validity of 
program impact estimates, many of which cannot be directly observed. The criticism 
escalated into a legal challenge by insurers and the state chamber of commerce. In 
particular, the case focused on whether to count all savings attributable to Dirigo Health, 
or only reductions in bad debt and charity care arising from expanded coverage. 
 
In May 2007, the Maine Supreme Court upheld the state’s right to count savings 
attributable to all Dirigo Health initiatives, rather than just its coverage expansions. 
Nonetheless, controversies over how the savings are calculated are likely to persist as long 
as SOP continues to be a Dirigo funding source. Virtually all informants interviewed for 
this study view it as politically unsustainable in its current form and regard alternative 
funding sources as necessary for moving DirigoChoice forward. 
 
DIRIGOCHOICE: MID-COURSE ADJUSTMENTS AND NEXT STEPS 
In addition to the SOP controversy, DirigoChoice has faced a number of implementation 
challenges. To its credit, the program has made several adjustments to respond to 
implementation experiences and changes in the health insurance market. 
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 However, most key informants interviewed believe more significant changes are 
needed for the program to make a greater contribution toward offering more affordable 
health coverage to all Maine residents by 2009. 
 
Benefit Design 
Maine tried to create an affordable, comprehensive benefit package for low-income 
individuals that costs less than available commercial products. Though attractive to some 
small firms, the comprehensive benefit package was criticized as running counter to 
market trends for products targeted to small employers. Firms that wish to offer coverage 
can find less comprehensive—and therefore, less expensive—products in the commercial 
market, though they are likely to come with very high deductibles. 
 
The inclusion of coverage for preexisting conditions made the program susceptible 
to attracting high-risk individuals who could not afford coverage otherwise. Indeed, some 
critics contended that the mental health benefits induced adverse selection. Reports that as 
many as 3,000 people enrolled in Anthem’s individual product switched to DirigoChoice 
heightened this concern, although it is unclear whether they did so to gain access to cost-
sharing subsidies or to secure coverage for particular services. 
 
Some evidence suggests DirigoChoice did not enroll a high-risk group. Anthem’s 
overall medical loss ratio was 76 percent in 2005 and 2006, well within industry norms. 
Moreover, because DirigoChoice claims fell below 80 percent of total premiums, Anthem 
was obligated to return to DHA most of the EMP funds held in reserve to compensate for 
losses in excess of this amount during the program’s first two years. 
 
To attract more small businesses and low-risk uninsured individuals, some 
stakeholders believe DirigoChoice benefits should be less comprehensive. They contend 
that small firms and younger people with modest incomes and limited medical needs 
would be more interested in narrower benefit packages that provide primarily catastrophic 
protection or products with very high cost-sharing and coinsurance provisions, if the 
premiums were markedly lower. 
 
In 2007, DirigoChoice responded to such criticism and tried to hold the line on 
premium increases by offering a new $2,500 deductible option to small employers. 
Consumer advocates and some providers criticized this decision, expecting that it would 
lead to low-income workers forgoing care, increased bad debt for providers, or both. 
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 The ongoing debate around the benefit package clearly illustrates the trade-off 
between coverage and cost. The decision to allow individuals with previous insurance to 
enroll was important to address underinsurance—coverage that does not adequately 
protect against high health care costs—especially for residents at lower incomes. While the 
program’s comprehensive benefit design may have remedied this problem for enrollees 
who had previous coverage with higher deductibles and excluded services, it drove up 
program costs overall. 
 
Pooling of Small Groups and Individuals and High-Risk Pools 
DirigoChoice attempted to combine small firms and individuals into one pool to lower 
premiums to individuals, and to address the failing individual insurance market by creating 
a larger pool. Other states such as New York and Massachusetts have tried or are pursuing 
a similar strategy to lower the cost of insurance to individuals. 
 
Pooling small groups and individuals usually raises the cost to small groups, 
though the increase can be relatively small if individuals do not compose the majority 
of enrollees. For example, an actuarial analysis estimated that the Massachusetts reforms 
would reduce individual premiums by 15 percent while increasing small group premiums 
just 1.5 percent—assuming the individual market would represent just 11 percent of the 
merged market.14
 
DirigoChoice did not experience such a favorable enrollment composition; 
individuals and sole proprietors represented approximately 70 percent of total enrollment, 
making small group coverage more expensive. Despite an overall 76 percent medical loss 
ratio in 2005–2006, Anthem reported a medical loss ratio of 102 percent for individuals 
compared with 66 percent for small groups and 73 percent for sole proprietors. In 2007, 
the Insurance Superintendent required DirigoChoice to divide the pool for premium 
rating purposes, although the difference in medical loss ratios for the groups may have 
forced the program to do this eventually to keep small group premiums competitive. 
 
The medical loss ratio experience for individuals in DirigoChoice also spurred a 
renewed push for a subsidized high-risk pool that would remove the highest-cost persons 
from the DirigoChoice risk pool. Skeptics have argued against a high-risk pool, believing 
that it would increase market segmentation. Alternatively, a combined small group and 
individual strategy is being explored as well as a reinsurance strategy that might mitigate 
the impact of high-cost users by limiting carrier exposure to risk, thereby reducing 
premiums. Advocates of the reinsurance strategy cite the successful experience of Healthy 
New York in curbing premium growth; a reinsurance feature protects carriers from very 
high claims.15
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 Dirigo Health’s Cost Containment Provisions 
To make health insurance expansion affordable, Maine recognized the importance of 
systemwide cost containment, as well as cost control within the DirigoChoice product. 
These goals remain elusive. 
 
Because premiums reflect systemwide health care costs, the Dirigo Health Reform 
Act took steps to constrain overall health spending. It strengthened the state’s certificate of 
need statute in an attempt to reduce excess capacity in the delivery system and produce 
future savings. It also established the Maine Quality Forum to administer public reporting 
and quality measurement activities that may yield cost savings in the long run. And, it set a 
minimum 80 percent medical loss ratio for small group products, set voluntary targets for 
hospital operating margins, and bolstered state health planning mechanisms. 
 
However, the defeat of more far-reaching cost-control proposals leads some 
observers to believe that the initiative will not adequately address the problem of high cost 
and rapid medical inflation in Maine. For example, voluntary targets on hospital cost 
growth (3% annually) and operating margins (3.5%) replaced a more stringent proposal to 
impose a global hospital budget limit. 
 
Meanwhile, DirigoChoice premiums have grown by about 17 percent from the 
start of the program in 2005 to the last quarter of 2006. With individuals now facing 
higher premium rates than those enrolled through small groups, many observers believe 
that rate increases will make the product increasingly unaffordable to individuals, especially 
those ineligible for subsidies. The program has explored ways to add more care and cost 
management features, including formal disease management programs for enrollees with 
chronic conditions, which are major drivers of cost. However, it is uncertain whether 
these strategies can reduce premiums sufficiently to make the product affordable to 
unenrolled small firms and individuals. 
 
Plan Administration, Marketing, and Risk-Sharing Arrangements 
While support for a public–private venture remains high, Anthem’s role in DirigoChoice’s 
administration drew mixed reviews. Some stakeholders expressed concerns that neither 
Anthem nor its brokers did enough to promote the program, and some leveled charges 
that Anthem agents actively dissuaded interested buyers. As the dominant carrier in the 
small group and individual markets, Anthem had leeway to steer customers to or away 
from DirigoChoice. It is unclear to what extent it did so. Insurance representatives 
counter that their marketing strategies were not to blame for lower-than-expected 
enrollment. Most small firms know about the plan, as shown by the study’s survey findings 
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 that nearly two-thirds of small firms in the state that do not offer health benefits to their 
employees were very or somewhat aware of the program. Instead, insurers say the 
problem lies in the product design. 
 
Additional points of friction between DHA and Anthem have been the profit 
Anthem makes on the contract and Anthem’s role in the lawsuit challenging the SOP. 
The need to re-bid the contract during 2007 put these issues on the legislative agenda in 
2006 and again in 2007, when several alternatives to the current arrangement were 
proposed. One option was for the state to self-insure. Another was to select a different 
carrier to insure and market the product. A third was for DHA to offer competing 
products from multiple carriers, similar to Massachusetts’ Connector program. A variation 
on the last approach would convert DirigoChoice into a voucher program. Individuals 
would use vouchers as a subsidy to defray the cost of a plan selected from a menu of 
products that would vary in benefits and price. This option, however, presumes a level of 
competition among plans that does not currently exist in Maine. 
 
Under the self-insurance option, DHA would enter into an administrative services-
only contract with a single vendor, either an insurer or third party administrator.16 DHA 
believed this approach would save EMP funds spent on the risk-sharing arrangement with 
Anthem and on the insurer’s profit margin on the product. Those who supported this 
option cited the success of the state employee health plan, which recently switched from a 
fully insured to a self-insured arrangement. They argued that Dirigo should pursue a 
similar course—possibly even by affiliating with the state employee program and pooling 
DirigoChoice participants with state employees. 
 
Critics argued that changing to a self-insured arrangement could provide only one-
time financial relief and would make no substantial difference in cost trends over time. 
They also charged that it would be perilous for the state to accept both the insurance and 
business risks of operating its own program. Their concern stemmed from problems in the 
MaineCare program, including the implementation of a new claims payment system that 
was plagued with problems and a long-delayed settlement of a backlog in hospital 
payments, both which have undermined confidence in the capabilities of a publicly 
sponsored program. 
 
Because DHA did not know if it would obtain authorization and funding from 
the state legislature to self-administer the product, DHA continued to negotiate with 
Anthem on the terms of a new contract. 17 When DHA and Anthem could not reach 
agreement, DHA pursued other options. In September 2007, DHA announced that it was 
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 switching the DirigoChoice contract from Anthem to Harvard Pilgrim Health Plan, a 
nonprofit plan that has served a very small share of the Maine market. This gives 
DirigoChoice the possibility of gaining one-time savings from the EMP payments that 
Anthem required as its price for accepting higher-than-average risk and to achieve a 
specified profit margin. The savings are relatively small (about $4 million) and it remains 
to be seen whether the new carrier will be more successful than Anthem in marketing 
DirigoChoice to small businesses. 
 
Increasing Small Firm Participation: Small Firm Incentives, Employer Mandate 
Some key informants charged that DirigoChoice can do little to increase small firm offer 
rates unless it offers greater incentives to motivate non-offering employers to initiate 
coverage. Key stakeholders have considered—and continue to debate—various incentives 
to persuade more small firms to offer health benefits to workers. For example, Governor 
John Baldacci included a proposal in his 2007 Dirigo reform package to mandate employer 
contributions to workers’ health coverage, but Maine lawmakers rejected it. Other 
possibilities include subsidies to certain types of firms and a reduction in the minimum 
employer share of DirigoChoice premiums, which is currently 60 percent. The 
legislature’s lack of action in 2007 leaves unresolved the debate over the merits of 
voluntary incentives versus an employer mandate. 
 
LESSONS FOR OTHER STATES 
To some extent, Maine’s health reform strategy uniquely reflects the state’s political 
environment, market dynamics, regulatory history, and financing options. But the 
initiatives ultimately selected—a subsidized insurance product for low- and moderate-
income individuals and modest Medicaid eligibility expansions—are much like those 
adopted by or considered by other states. As such, Maine’s experience in designing 
and implementing the initiatives could be useful to other states seeking to expand 
insurance coverage. 
 
The greater the subsidy, the greater the demand. However, raising funds to 
finance such subsidies is politically difficult, regardless of the source. 
As demonstrated by high levels of enrollment in the Medicaid eligibility expansion groups, 
more people with very low income will enroll in a fully subsidized health plan than in one 
requiring enrollee contributions, even when premiums and deductibles are heavily subsidized. 
 
Greater reliance on Medicaid eligibility expansions to increase coverage, however, 
raises the cost to state government. Nearly every state has constraints on the financial 
resources available to expand public programs. Taxing providers, insurers, employers, or 
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 consumers of health care carries political risks. At the same time, Maine’s experience 
suggests that attempts to capture savings in the overall health system and use them to 
finance coverage expansions can be as difficult to implement as enacting direct taxes. 
 
States with low employer offer rates may not be able to raise them substantially 
without strong employer incentives or mandates. 
Despite the desire by many state policymakers to expand health insurance by building on 
and shoring up the employer health insurance system, Maine’s experience demonstrates 
the limits of a voluntary system. DirigoChoice was modestly successful in enrolling small 
firms, but total small group enrollment remains low relative to the number of small firms 
eligible.18 States that want to increase—rather than simply maintain—employer offer rates 
must consider stronger incentives to persuade employers to offer and contribute to 
employee health insurance costs. However, in states like Maine with high health care 
costs, employer mandates may pose an unaffordable burden on small firms unless overall 
system costs can be brought under control. 
 
Partnerships and contracts between states and insurers must be crafted 
based on a realistic assessment of the market and the expected value of 
sharing responsibilities. 
Without a guaranteed number of enrollees in the program and only one interested carrier, 
DirigoChoice did not have a great deal of leverage in price negotiations with Anthem. 
Any state creating a new program will face a similar problem—unknown risk that may 
dissuade insurers from participating or lead them to demand additional payment to take on 
the risk. These issues are aggravated in states with highly concentrated insurance markets; 
most states fall into this category.19
 
Coverage expansions without forceful cost control mechanisms will confront 
affordability problems, sooner or later. 
Program viability is directly tied to efforts to control cost growth. Options for restraining 
premium rate increases were limited in Maine, a state with little provider competition or 
managed care and a highly concentrated insurance market. A relatively comprehensive 
subsidized insurance product might be more successful in states with: lower health care 
costs, either due to greater competition among providers or more managed care; and 
greater price competition among health plans or stronger regulation to constrain premiums. 
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 METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES 
 
DirigoChoice and Medicaid Enrollment Data. Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. (MPR) 
obtained DirigoChoice enrollment data from the Dirigo Health Agency (DHA) to conduct an 
independent analysis of trends and enrollee characteristics. DHA’s administrative files included data 
on DirigoChoice members ever enrolled since the program began in January 2005 through 
September 2006. DHA also provided summary Medicaid enrollment data based on data reported 
by the Maine Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Medical Services, and the 
Maine Legislature’s Office of Fiscal and Program Review. 
 
Small Employer Survey. MPR conducted a survey of small firms enrolled in DirigoChoice in 
the fall of 2006, among randomly selected small firms in Maine eligible to enroll in DirigoChoice 
that chose not to do so. MPR selected the survey sample to ensure valid comparisons between 
Maine firms eligible for DirigoChoice participating in the program, and similar firms that were not. 
All surveyed firms were screened to ensure they were eligible for DirigoChoice by meeting 
program requirements. The sample file of DirigoChoice firms was created from a random sample of 
713 firms offering DirigoChoice coverage from a list of all businesses participating in DirigoChoice 
obtained from DHA. The DirigoChoice sample file contained all 713 participating firms except 
the 25 firms that took part in a pretest of the survey. An additional 800 comparable firms in Maine 
not currently participating in DirigoChoice were randomly selected from a list provided by Dunn 
and Bradstreet, a firm that provides information about businesses throughout the United States. 
MPR fielded the survey from October 2006 through January 2007. Of the 1,513 firms sampled, 
776 eligible firms completed the survey; an additional 376 firms were determined to be ineligible. 
The remaining 361 firms did not complete surveys because they refused to participate, could not 
be located, or could not be interviewed during the field period. The overall weighted response 
rate was 69 percent. A complete review of the survey design, sampling methods, survey 
administration, response rates, and weighting techniques can be viewed in Appendix A of the full 
report, found at http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/health/dirigochoice.asp. 
 
Key Informant Interviews. In late 2006, MPR held in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 
35 key informants representing various interest groups in Maine, all of whom were involved in the 
development or implementation of DirigoChoice from November 2006 to January 2007. 
Interviewees included: state executive agency officials and staff (7), state legislators (3), insurance 
plans, agents, and brokers (9), consumer advocates (4), provider organizations (3), small businesses 
(6), and health policy analysts (3). Most interviews were conducted in person in Portland and 
Augusta, and some were held by phone. MPR also conducted an extensive review of Maine’s 
health care and insurance system, and the evolution of Dirigo Health, through a variety of studies, 
reports, legal rulings, and other documents. 
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1 Current Population Survey (CPS) (Washington, D.C. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003); 
and E. Ziller and E. Kilbreth, Health Insurance Coverage Among Maine Residents: The Results of a 
Household Survey 2002 (Portland, Maine: University of Southern Maine, Edmund S. Muskie 
School of Public Service, Institute for Health Policy, May 2003), available at 
http://www.muskie.usm.maine.edu/m_view_publication.jsp?id=1649. 
2 Ziller and Kilbreth, Health Insurance Coverage, 2003. 
3 J. Gabel, R. McDevitt, L. Gandolfo et al., “Generosity and Adjusted Premiums in Job-Based 
Insurance: Hawaii Is Up and Wyoming Is Down,” Health Affairs, May/June 2006 25(3):832–43. 
4 A. B. Martin, L. Whittle, S. Heffler et al., “Health Spending by State of Residence, 1991–
2004,” Health Affairs Web Exclusive (Sept. 18, 2007):w651–w663. 
5 “Market Snapshot—Small Group Health Insurers” (Augusta, Maine: Maine Bureau of Insurance, 
2006), available at http://www.maine.gov/pfr/insurance/employer/snapshot_small_group.htm. 
6 Such “dual eligibles” include childless adults with income below 100% FPL, as well as 
parents of children under age 19 and children who live in families earning less than 200% FPL. 
People who apply to enroll in DirigoChoice as individuals or sole proprietors (i.e., not as a worker 
in a small firm) who are Medicaid eligible are enrolled only in MaineCare. 
7 State program officials refer to premiums as “monthly cost of coverage” since payments on 
behalf of members are made to Dirigo Health Agency (DHA), not the insurer and because these 
payments may come from multiple sources (employer, employee, individual, and DHA revenues) 
depending on the type of enrollee and their subsidy level. 
8 J. Rosenthal and C. Pernice, Designing Maine’s DirigoChoice Benefit Plan (Portland, Maine: 
National Academy for State Health Policy, Dec. 2004). 
9 B. Gorman, D. Gorman, E. Kilbreth et al., Actuarial Report of Reform Options for Maine’s 
Individual Health Insurance Market (Marlborough, Mass.: Gorman Actuarial, LLC, May 2007). 
Prepared for the Maine Bureau of Insurance. 
10 In August 2007, DirigoChoice member enrollment stood at 15,113 (Dirigo Health Agency, 
2007, Monthly Numbers, Aug. 2007). 
11 The range covers estimates of DirigoChoice enrollees who had been uninsured for the 
entire 12 months prior to enrollment, and those who were uninsured at the point of enrollment. 
12 Results of Mathematica’s 2006 survey of small firms in Maine conducted as part of this 
evaluation are summarized in Chapter V of the full report, available at http://www.mathematica-
mpr.com/health/dirigochoice.asp. 
13 Dirigo Health Agency (DHA) administrative data show an average of 4.3 employees among 
firms enrolled in DirigoChoice. DHA’s average is based on number of employees eligible for health 
benefits, while the survey average is based on total number of employees, including part-time 
workers (less than 20 hours per week) and those employed less than 26 weeks per year, who are 
generally not eligible for health benefits. 
14 Gorman Actuarial, LLC, DeWeese Consulting, Inc., Hinckley, Allen & Tringale LP, Impact 
of Merging the Massachusetts Non-Group and Small Group Health Insurance Markets (Marlborough, 
Mass.: Gorman Actuarial, LLC, 2006). Prepared for the Massachusetts Division of Insurance and 
Market Merger Special Commission. 
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15 E. Kilbreth, Comparing the DirigoChoice Program Experience with Other State Initiatives Targeted 
to Small Businesses and Individuals (Portland, Maine: University of Southern Maine, Edmund S. 
Muskie School of Public Service, Institute for Health Policy, Aug. 2006), available at 
http://www.muskie.usm.maine.edu/m_view_publication.jsp?id=3809. 
16 The Dirigo Health Reform Act allowed for a self-insurance option, but only if no bidder 
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